Positivist and Humanist Mathematics: A Case for Schism

Advith Govindarajan, PhD student at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

If intuitionism has been characterized with a certain propriety as revolutionists who overturned the ancien régime, Hilbert might be compared with Napoleon who, without regard for considerations of legitimacy, established, through a brilliant political stroke, a new order whose success is the substitute for legitimacy.
Kurt Grelling, 1928

And yet when one hears one of the greatest living mathematicians calmly telling the world that a considerable part of our analysis is devoid of proof, if not nonsense, and when one beholds the mighty efforts which the champions of Weierstrass are making to repel these attacks, it is reasonable, in view of such facts, to ask ourselves, ‘Is all well?’
James Pierpont, 1928

Taken from “Mystic, Geometer, and Intuitionist: The Life of L. E. J. Brouwer” by Dirk van Dalen

The discipline of Mathematics actualizes itself in the interstitial spaces between our research: in the coffee breaks during conferences, in the asides and footnotes in monographs, and in forum posts of mathematical communities. In those spaces we often hear and refer to the great crises of the past, of the crisis in euclidean geometry, of the crisis in foundations, of the crisis of formalism and constructivism. We now find ourselves in a new crisis which dominates the chatter of the collective coffee rooms of the world. Mathematics has been able to reconstitute itself from those past crises into a singular discipline; however I believe today the divisions are too deep to recover. I make a case for splitting the discipline into two: A positivist mathematics and a humanist mathematics, each with its own journals, institutions, faculty and norms.

There have always been two parts to our discipline. The first part, the positivist aspect of mathematics, entails formulating and proving theorems as its ultimate end goal. The second part, the humanist aspect of mathematics, entails the formulation of mathematical beauty and maturity as its ultimate end goal. These two parts have historically gone along hand-in-hand, with few eruptions. The humanist tradition of mathematics has been fruitful for the positivist end goals, and those positivist end goals have given direction and purpose to the humanist tradition. The current advances in AI technology now have broken this fruitful cooperation. We are reaching a stage where machines can now prove theorems, and we are not too far from the day where an engineer or scientist, needing grounding for a new theory or invention, can ask a machine to formulate the appropriate mathematical background and answer the relevant theorems.

There is of course, still a great need for humans in positivist mathematics: we still need humans to clean up proofs, to guide research directions, to act as the interface between the machines and their application. This is anathema to most humanist mathematicians: no longer would we be building towards mathematical beauty, but rather our discipline would be in some ways, ancillary to a greater project taken over by the machines. Personally, I fall in the humanist camp, but I think it is wrong to dismiss positivism entirely. The goal of positivist mathematics is certainly great: to facilitate the production and maintenance of the book of all the world’s greatest theorems. However, this goal is fundamentally incompatible with the way many of us want to do mathematics.

Some people wave away this incompatibility, arguing that we can square the difference: let humans work in theory formulation, and leave the rest up to the machines. It must be understood that this is already the positivist position. Indeed, it admits that our goal is the formulation of important theorems, and that our discipline should adapt itself to whatever new technologies are possible to achieve that goal. No one knows how far this technology will develop, but this attitude would see it that mathematicians continue to adapt as far as possible to those demands.

On the other hand, in the humanist viewpoint, we may see this as fundamentally absurd. The goal of humanist mathematics is the general development of the intellect. In this sense it shares allegiances with the arts and the humanities, even as it sometimes aids in the work of scientific discovery. Do we stop playing the piano just because digital synthesizers exist? Do we stop painting just because we have photography? Creating the most perfect, realistic image possible to capture the world is certainly a noble pursuit, but we should not let that stop us from engaging in the enterprise of painting as self-expression. By splitting mathematics in twain, both the positivists and humanists will find themselves more free. The positivists will be more free to pursue mathematics as a pure science, and the humanists will be more free to pursue mathematics as a form of beautiful self-expression.

To those reading this, imagine yourself on a hiring committee weighing two different job candidates. The first applicant has 30 papers. The papers are generally rough to read but answer some of the most important questions in the subfield. All their papers make very heavy use of the most advanced LLM technologies. They may answer poorly when asked to recall and explain much of their work but clearly understand intimately how to use LLMs to generate useful, important and interesting results. The second applicant has 5 papers, all human written. The questions they answer are small, some questions they answer are even already known! But the exposition in their papers is stunning and beautiful. When you interview them they are lively and demonstrate deep understanding and love of their work. Which candidate do you hire? The answer to this question determines where you fall along the positivist-humanist axis. It seems clear to me that these two candidates are working in fundamentally different disciplines and traditions, and that treating them in the same pool is a mistake.

If Mathematics does split along this division, it will be with some inevitable strife. Determining which departments, journals, conferences and institutions value the positivist endeavour and which ones value the humanist endeavour may require some bitter conflict. However, the disciplines that emerge from this conflict, Positivist Mathematics and Humanist Mathematics, will be stronger for it. If we do not make these decisions consciously, they will be made unconsciously for us. If we do not split the discipline in two, one half of the discipline will inevitably dominate the other, and we will all be worse off for it. After all of the great crises of mathematics in which it survived as a whole, we now find ourselves in an entirely unprecedented situation. We either schism or die.


Received 12 October 2026.

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2 responses to “Positivist and Humanist Mathematics: A Case for Schism”

  1. A. N. Avatar
    A. N.

    I will say to you what I said to the Christian establishment every time they had a schism or called on the grand heresiarch: remember, when you affix the letters and call for a denunciation, that at the end of the day someone will get nailed because of the schism. Will you want it to be in your name?

    Let me try to directly address what seems to be the most pressing problem at hand. You seem to believe that there is a fundamental divide in a candidate with 30 papers which answer extremely difficult questions and 5 papers with small research contributions – as if these are the only options.

    What if I propose to you a third candidate. This one has 9 papers, all of which are quite carefully written with a nice exposition. 3 of them they derived with almost no LLM usage, 3 of them they did with some AI assistance, 3 of them are large collaborative papers that use very heavy models and answer important questions; they are single authors of 3 of these, have collaborators on the other 3, and the heavily AI papers have more than 50 authors; but they can explain quite carefully what goes on in each of them, what their exact contribution is, where it fits in the large scale question; and they can articulate their own research vision, which they have matured, and where they use LLMs to be able to better grasp a large number of strands of the literature that would otherwise be impossible to quickly navigate (i.e., running translations from a given formalism to another, rewriting results to a different context you understand better, etc).

    Who do you want to hire now? Maybe you want to hire the one with 5 papers, but what is the reason for that – do you judge this other candidate to be less creative, less driven, less passionate, less interested? Why so? If the point you are making is sociological – one should preserve humanist knowledge – I believe there is no argument; if the point is metaphysical, I would ask why the metaphysics matters.

    I am not claiming that this can be achieved easily. You need structure that supports this. Hard LLM usage should be relegated to a certain class of problem which has resisted every expert, and should be moved up along the academic ladder; mathematical maturity warrants better usage of tools, better usage benefits everyone and avoids many of the fundamental problems which many have pointed out with AI – the cognitive surrender, the intrinsic risks of atomization, never-skilling, etc. It should be organized in such a way that contributors to the problems at hand who oppose usage of LLMs, but still want to be deeply involved in the underlying research, can do it, and where inequal use can be overcome through fraternal and collegial collaboration, through mutual trust and understanding. It also necessarily forces that the role of journals and funding agencies be reorganized.

    The point of a paper should be the effective communication of results, but the current ease of assembling interactive presentations means that written long form papers need not be the only way that things are communicated. I think we should recognize their role in forcing the systematic organization of ideas, and save them for the purposes which matter. They should count for your CV as much as many other contributions you might make, as a specific kind of thing that you know how to do; not as a unique measure of your value as a researcher. But this much was obvious before LLMs and AI right?

    (It is perhaps academic naivete that has prevented us from seeing that there is a huge market with a vested interest in maintaining the prominence of journals as a measure for hiring, since it allows the robber-barons running the journals to keep their stranglehold on what is and always was an academic driven enterprise, which ought to be the domain of everyone.)

    How do you know that someone is a good researcher, a good teacher, a good academic? Well, how do you know that anyone is good at anything – you look around carefully. If the problem is that you don’t have our three candidates as above, but 250 candidates which we need to shortlist down to those three, let me ask: do you think that the people currently hired were so because they satisfied the precise criteria that were laid out for them? I mean, hiring problems are known to be difficult enough that there’s counterintuitive puzzles on how to interview 30% and then pick the next one (numbers may vary). I think there is a general rule of thumb which applies in these cases: if a system becomes too difficult to optimize, don’t try to. Set up a general system which catches people with a minimum of qualifications – a *human* system which picks those people, mind you – draw up a general profile with which you might be happy which is precise enough, but not too precise, and then run a roulette, draw cards, or ask a fortune teller. If a candidate doesn’t make it, give them a gold token. Next time they clear the initial stage, they get an extra ball thrown in the game. Frankly, would this be very different? Or are we really happy with replacing the system by pure word of mouth, which seems to be the even more radical way in which things are turning about.

    Journal selection criteria and hiring criteria have in common that neither are new problems; they are problems made worse by a rift which exposes the inherent contradictions which these mechanisms, as they exist in operation on a capitalist system, will inherently bring about. I believe doubling down on those contradictions can have as a result only more suffering, more injustice and more inhumanity, all done in the name of preserving some metaphysical purity which, in my view, simply does not exist.

    The end result of calling for a schism is, sure enough, a schism. I would rather call for people to accept the revolutionary potential – in the marxist sense – of a technology that sees human knowledge as one gigantic pool to be drawn from; to try to come to a fraternal understanding of the needs of research that emphasize human cooperation, and reject the radical capitalist structure which has put us in a position where LLMs are an actual danger to the continuation of mathematical research; and a radical opposition to the people who have monopolized this technology by, at best, blatant disregard for the economic and ecological conditions for its production, and at worst, outright theft. I don’t care if every mathematician in the world gets fired (as an early career mathematician, I can certainly begrudgingly embrace an alternative career as a fireman), one should both fight the capitalists whilst recognising that the technology they have produced can be harnessed for a better world without burning through the rest of the Amazon rainforest.

  2. Colin Tan Avatar
    Colin Tan

    There is now the Journal of AI-assisted Math.

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